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Abstract
In this paper we develop and estimate a new-Keynesian model of inﬂation and
use it to investigate the hypothesis that prices in the UK are re-set more frequently
during periods of high inﬂation. In the model, ﬁrms are assumed to condition their
expectations on an optimally-selected but incomplete information set and we further
assume that the probability that they will reset their price in any quarter depends
upon the prevailing inﬂationary regime. The model implies more complex inﬂation
dynamics than conventional new-Keynesian models predict. We ﬁnd that we cannot
reject the formal restrictions implied by the model (using UK quarterly data) and we
estimate that the mean time before prices were reset was around eight months during
the ‘high’ inﬂationary regime and approximately two years when mean inﬂation was
‘low’.
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Key Words: Rational expectations, incomplete information,
macroeconomic dynamics, regime switching
1The authors acknowledge ﬁnancial assistance from the Economic and Social Research Council:
Award Reference R000223926, ‘The imperfect use of information and inﬂation-output dynamics’.Inflation Dynamics and Inflation Regimes 1
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In this paper we develop and estimate a new-Keynesian model of inﬂation
and use it to investigate the hypothesis that prices in the UK are re-set
more frequently during periods of high inﬂation. The model diﬀers from
existing new-Keynesian models in three key respects. First, we allow ﬁrms
to diﬀer randomly in their technology and hence in their marginal costs.
Speciﬁcally, we model a ﬁrm’s marginal costs as the sum of two separate
components: the ﬁrst is speciﬁct ot h eﬁrm itself, the second is common to
all ﬁrms. Observation of its own marginal costs does not allow a ﬁrm to
distinguish these two components perfectly, and this gives it an incentive to
acquire information about other ﬁrms’ marginal costs in order to improve
the forecasts it makes of its own.
We assume that the acquisition and processing of this information is
costly and, in our second extension, we assume that ﬁrms optimally select
the information set on which to condition their forecasts - enlarging their in-
formation set up to the point where the marginal costs and marginal beneﬁts
of extending it further are equal. This in turn implies that ﬁrms will typ-
ically choose to condition their expectations on an incomplete information
set. They will therefore not form conventional, fully-rational expectations
(RE). We call the expectations they do form optimally rational expectations
(ORE): they are rational because ﬁrms fully exploit their chosen informa-
tion set; they are optimal because this information set itself is the result of
a conventional optimising process.1
This departure from RE accords with recent work within the new-Keynesian
(and other) literature, much of which has found that the assumption of RE
is too strong. At the same time ORE is theoretically more satisfactory
than the ad hoc assumptions, such as adaptive or quasi-adaptive expecta-
tions, that others have used.2 We show that the incorporation of ORE has
important implications for the dynamics of inﬂation: in particular it can,
in principle, explain the observed inﬂuence of lagged inﬂa t i o no nc u r r e n t
inﬂation - a feature that new-Keynesian models incorporating RE cannot
explain.
1Elsewhere in the literature such expectations have been called ‘economically rational
expectations’ (see Crettez and Michel (1992)). The concept is also similar to the notions
of near and bounded rationality (see Conlisk (1996)) and Galbraith’s (1988) ‘errors-in-
variable’ model of expectations.
2For examples see Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Galí and Gertler (1999) and Galí et al.
(2001). For similar models applied to the UK case see Balakrishnan and López-Salido
(2000, 2001). Mankiw (2001) incorporates adaptive expectations into a New-Keynesian
model to explain the stylised facts of the dynamic response of inﬂation and unemployment
to monetary shocks. Ball (2000) assumes that ﬁrms use only lagged inﬂa t i o nw h e nf o r m i n g
expectations, a feature he labels ‘near-rationality’. Roberts (1997, 1998) measures expec-
tations from survey data. In models closer to the one presented in this paper, Mankiw
and Reis (2001) assume information disperses slowly across the economy and Woodford
(2001) considers the eﬀects of noisy information in a Phelps island model context.Inflation Dynamics and Inflation Regimes 2
Our third extension is to allow the stickiness of prices, as measured by
the probability of a ﬁrm resetting its price, to be a function of the under-
lying inﬂation regime. Most new-Keynesian models treat this probability
as ﬁxed despite Taylor’s (1999, p.1021) assessment that ‘ ... prices at small
businesses, industrial prices, and even the prices of products like magazines
are adjusted more quickly when the rate of inﬂation is higher. The depen-
dency of price and wage setting on events in the economy is one of the more
robust empirical ﬁndings in the studies reviewed here’. As part of our in-
v e s t i g a t i o no ft h i se ﬀect, we identify ‘high’ and ‘low’ inﬂation regimes for
the UK by estimating a two-state Markov switching model; we also exam-
ine the behaviour of the re-set probability using moving-window regression
techniques.
Our principal empirical ﬁndings are that a new-Keynesian model which
incorporates ORE and the expected eﬀects of the inﬂation regime on the
probability of resetting prices ﬁnds support in UK data: ﬁrms’ use of an
imperfect information set can account for observed UK inﬂationary dynam-
ics; and that the probability of resetting prices is appreciably higher when
inﬂa t i o ni sh i g h .W ee s t i m a t et h a tt h em e a nt i m eb e f o r eap r i c ei sr e s e tw a s
around eight months during the period when UK mean inﬂation was ‘high’,
and approximately two years when inﬂation was ‘low’.
The paper is in three sections. In the ﬁrst we develop the model. In the
second we describe the data, report the results and use them to show how
inﬂation dynamics are altered by the eﬀects diﬀerent inﬂation regimes have
on the probability of a ﬁrm resetting its price. We end with a summary.
2 The Model
We assume a continuum of ﬁrms indexed by j ∈ [0,1].3 Each ﬁrm is a
monopolistic competitor and produces a diﬀerentiated good Yj,t,w h i c hi t
sells at the nominal price Pj,t.E a c hﬁrm faces an iso-elastic demand curve
given by Yj,t =( Pj,t/Pt)−χYt where Yt and Pt are aggregate output and the
aggregate price level respectively. We assume that output is a simple linear
function of the single factor, labour. Speciﬁcally, the production function
for ﬁrm j is Yj,t = Aj,tNj,t, where Nj,t is the quantity of labour employed
by ﬁrm j in period t and Aj,t is a technological factor aﬀecting ﬁrm j.N o t e
that by indexing the technology factor on j we are departing from the usual
assumption (see, for example, Gali et al. (2001)) that this factor is common
to all ﬁrms.
Nominal prices are assumed to be set as suggested in Calvo (1983): each
ﬁrm resets its price with probability 1−θ each period, independently of the
3Our underlying assumptions are initially the same as those presented in Gali et al.
(2001) with the simpliﬁcation that the production function is linear in the single factor,
labour.Inflation Dynamics and Inflation Regimes 3
time elapsed since the last adjustment. So, each period, 1−θ of ﬁrms reset
their prices. θ is therefore a measure of price rigidity. For the moment we
shall make the standard assumption that this probability is ﬁxed.
Those ﬁrms which do reset are assumed to do so with the aim of max-
imising their expected discounted proﬁts given technology, factor prices,
and the constraint on price adjustment deﬁned by θ. The resulting optimal
price-setting rule is that each ﬁrm should set its price as a markup over a
discounted stream of expected future nominal marginal costs, where, if the
ﬁrm faces a low probability of being able to reset its price, (a high value of
θ), the ﬁrm places more weight on expected future marginal costs. Formally,
a logarithmic approximation to the optimising rule is,4
p∗




which can be re-written more conveniently for our purposes as,
p∗





j,t is the log of the newly-set price of ﬁrm j; µ ≡ χ/(χ − 1) and is
the ﬁrm’s desired gross markup; MCj,t+k is the logarithm of the nominal
marginal cost in period t + k of a ﬁrm which last reset its price in period
t;a n dβ is a subjective discount factor. Notice that the marginal cost
terms in equations (1) and (2) are indexed on j b e c a u s ew ea r ea l l o w i n g
the technological factor - and hence the marginal costs of ﬁrms who reset
their prices - to diﬀer amongst ﬁrms. Firms with a greater than average
technological factor will have lower than average marginal cost.
Most new-Keynesian models build on equation (2) by assuming that
ﬁrms form their expectations about current and future marginal costs fully
rationally, that is by conditioning them on all available information. How-
ever, most empirical studies suggest that new-Keynesian models which in-
corporate RE are empirically unsatisfactory - speciﬁcally they fail to predict
the dynamics of inﬂation - and they have been forced to incorporate other
ad hoc models of expectations formation.
To avoid both empirical rejection and theoretical awkwardness, we incor-
porate a model of expectations developed in Demery and Duck (2002) and
used by them in simpler form in Demery and Duck (2001). This model of
expectations formation assumes that, rather than using all possible available
information, at least some of which might be regarded as costly to acquire,
agents will select their information set by weighing up the costs of acquiring
more information against the beneﬁts it confers. Having thus decided their
information set, agents fully exploit it. Demery and Duck (2002) term these
expectations ‘optimally rational expectations’ because the selection of the
4See Galí et al. (2001 p. 1244).Inflation Dynamics and Inflation Regimes 4
information involves a standard optimising process, and, given that informa-
tion set, the agent is assumed to make rational expectations. They suggest
that, in general, ORE will involve the use of an incomplete information set.
To apply this idea here we begin by assuming that ∆MCt, the change
in the log of the economy-wide average nominal marginal cost, follows a
stationary process and therefore has the moving-average representation,
∆MCt = d +
T X
i=0
αiεt−i ≡ d + α(L)εt (3)
where α0 =1 ; εt is white noise; and d is a constant.
We further assume that the deviation of ∆MCj,t from this average is
itself a stationary process such that,
∆MCj,t = d + ∆MCt +
T X
i=0
γiuj,t−i ≡ ∆MCt + γ(L)uj,t (4)
where γ0 =1 ;a n duj,t is also white noise.5
Combining equations (3) and (4) gives,







One way of interpreting the conventional RE assumption is that each ﬁrm
conditions its expectations of ∆MCj,t+k (k ≥ 0) in period t on an informa-
tion set which contains the separate histories of {εt} and {uj,t},b yw h i c hw e
mean {εt,εt−1....εt−∞} and {uj,t,u j,t−1,....uj,t−∞}. I nt h i sc o n t e x t ,t h i si s
what we mean by conditioning on all the available information. So, assuming
RE, it follows that,
If 0 ≤ k<T:
EF









Observation of the separate history of {εt} could arise from direct ob-
servation of the aggregate variable ∆MCt from some published source. Ob-
servation of the history of {uj,t} would then occur naturally from observa-
tion of ∆MCj,t. An alternative interpretation of RE, which is more useful
for what follows, is that a ﬁrm which has no direct observation of the ag-
gregate variable ∆MCt, but which observes the histories of {∆MCs,t} for
5Although it is important that α(L) and γ(L) diﬀer, we assume that the lag lengths
of the two components are the same. There is nothing restricting or substantive in this
assumption. If the lag lengths were diﬀerent they could be made to be the same by adding
the required number of zero coeﬃcients to the component with the lower lag length.Inflation Dynamics and Inflation Regimes 5
s =1 ,2,..j,..S (where S is the total number of ﬁrms), in eﬀect observes the
separate histories of {εt} and {uj,t} s i n c et h ea v e r a g ev a l u eo f{∆MCs,t} is
∆MCt. From this alternative perspective, a conventional rational expecta-
tion of ∆MCj,t+k can be seen as one formed by a ﬁrm which has been willing
to incur the costs of acquiring the histories of {∆MCs,t} for s =1 ,2,..j,..S.
Consider now the case of ﬁrm j which has found it optimal not to ac-
quire this complete information set, but which has instead acquired the
histories of R such series, one of which is its own, where 1 ≤ R<S .
Each of the R observed histories, t a k e no ni t so w n , amounts to an obser-
vation on {d + α(L)εt + γ(L)us,t} from {∆MCs,t}, where ∆MCs,t is one of
the R series observed by ﬁrm j.6 However, taken together, they also pro-








s=1 ∆MCs,t.T h i sm e a ns e r i e sc a nb ew r i t t e na s ,
∆MCR,j,t = d + α(L)εt + γ(L)uR,j,t (6)
where uR,j,t ≡ 1
R
PR








The sum of two MA processes can be reparameterised as a single MA
process.7 So equation (6) can be rewritten as,
∆MCR,j,t = d + ρR(L)ηR,j,t (7)
where ηR,j,t is white noise by construction; ρR(L) is a polynomial in the lag
operator with ρR,0 =1 ;a n dt h ev a r i a n c eo fηR,j,t, σ2
ηR,a n dt h ee l e m e n t s










From equations (6) and (7) it follows that, for this ﬁrm, ∆MCj,t can
be represented as the sum of two separately observed white-noise error
processes,












is observed from the joint observation of R series;
and the separate history of {uj,t − uR,j,t} is the extra information obtained
from observing the separate history of the jth series.
It follows from equation (8) that a ﬁrm observing the R separate histories
{∆MCs,t}, and fully exploiting that information, will form expectations of
6We assume that σ
2
u and the parameters d, αi and γi are common to all ﬁrms.
7See, for example, Hamilton (1994, pp. 102-107). Note that the ρRs will be common
to all ﬁrms provided the γsa n dt h ev a r i a n c eo fus,t are common to all ﬁrms, which we
shall assume they are.Inflation Dynamics and Inflation Regimes 6
the current and future values of ∆MCj,t as follows:
If 0 ≤ k<T:
ER








j,tMCj,t+k = d (9)
where the notation ER
j,t deﬁnes ﬁrm j’s expectations conditioned on an in-
formation set consisting of R histories. Once again, ‘fully exploits’ means




and {uj,t − uR,j,t}
c a nb eu s e dt or e d u c et h eﬁrm’s forecast error.8
If, as appears plausible, the marginal beneﬁts of greater forecast accuracy
are decreasing, whereas the extra costs of enlarging the information set are
increasing, it is likely to be optimal for ﬁrms not to acquire the complete
information set.9 Furthermore, RE is an empirically detectable, special case
of ORE. Consequently, we shall develop the model on the assumption that
ﬁrms condition their expectations on an incomplete information set.
With this assumption it follows that we can write p∗
j,t as,
p∗








i (uj,t+k−i − uR,j,t+k−i) (10)


















We shall assume that a suﬃciently large number of ﬁrms reset their prices
each period to justify the assumption that the average value of ut−i+k across
those ﬁrms will be zero.10 We also shall assume that any other ﬁrm has an
equal probability of being included in any particular ﬁrm’s information set
so that the average value of uR,j,t+k−i across all ﬁr m si sa l s oz e r o . 11
8It is relatively straightforward to show that the forecast error from equation (9) is
white noise. See Demery and Duck (2002).
9As mentioned earlier, ﬁrms could in principle distinguish between the common and
idiosyncratic histories by accessing published data on aggregate marginal cost. Demery and
Duck (2001) justify the assumption that ﬁrms do not use such information on two grounds.
First, that, whilst, in principle, information about aggregate behaviour is relatively cheaply
available in oﬃcial or non-oﬃcial sources, in practice there are the usual publication delays
and revisions which make current and recent aggregate data unavailable or unreliable. And
second, they carry out a series of simulation experiments to gauge the loss of proﬁts a ﬁrm
would incur by basing its expectations on limited rather than full information. They ﬁnd
that, in general, these proﬁt losses are likely to be very small.
10We are also assuming that uj,t is independent across ﬁr m sa n dh a saﬁnite variance.
11In reality, it is more likely that ﬁms will ‘network’ and that the probability any other
series has of being included in ﬁrm j’s information set will depend upon (say) its geograph-
ical or industrial proximity to ﬁrm j. In this ‘networking’ case, groups of ﬁrms will share
the same information set, each being informed of the others’ ∆MCs,t and their histories.Inflation Dynamics and Inflation Regimes 7
The average price set by those ﬁrms who are resetting can therefore be
written as,
p∗




where ηR,t−i is the average value of ηR,j,t−i over the ﬁrms resetting in period
t.
From equations (5) and (8) and our assumptions that ut−i+k and uR,j,t+k−i
s u mt oz e r oa c r o s sﬁrms who are resetting their price, we can write,
α(L)εt = ρR(L)ηR,t (12)
We deﬁne the current price level as a weighted average of the prices of those
ﬁrms which are resetting and those which are not. Since all previous prices
have the same probability of being reset, the current price level can be seen
as a weighted sum of the average prices of those resetting and the average
price level in the previous period. Formally,
pt =( 1− θ)p∗
t + θpt−1 (13)
From equations (11) and (13) we can derive the inﬂation rate (πt ≡ pt−pt−1),
πt = θπt−1 +( 1− θ)[∆MCt + k0ηR,t +
∞ X
i=1
((ki − ki−1)ηR,t−i)] (14)
and hence,






0 = ρR,0 + k0; k∗
1 = ρR,1 + k1 − k0; k∗
2 = ρR,2 + k2 − k1;....;k∗
n =
ρR,n + kn − kn−1.
A more informative way of representing our model can be derived by





Substituting equation (16) into equation (15) we obtain,








Such informal channels are likely to be important sources of low-cost information and of-
ten integral to the ﬁrm’s participation in economic activity. In the interests of simplicity
we assume that each ﬁrm obtains information from a random draw of R − 1 realisations
of ∆MCs,t. This means that no two ﬁrms will share the same information set other than
by chance.Inflation Dynamics and Inflation Regimes 8
which we can re-write as,
πt =[ θ − ρR,1]πt−1 +[ θρR,1 − ρR,2]πt−2 +[ θρR,2 − ρR,3]πt−3 + ...





If we had made the normal rational expectations assumption - that each
ﬁrm is fully informed about the separate realisations of εt and uj,t -t h e n
α(L)
ρR(L) would equal 1, ηR,t would equal εt and equation (18) could be written
as,





A comparison of equations (18) with (19) shows that a major implication
of ORE is that inﬂation is likely to be more heavily inﬂuenced by lags in
inﬂation than the standard RE model implies.12 The intuition for this is
that with less knowledge of the precise nature of the shocks aﬀecting their
marginal costs, ﬁrms will be unable to react to them as accurately and
promptly as they would if they were fully informed. This, of course, is not
the result of any irrationality but of their deliberate choice to trade oﬀ some
lower forecast accuracy for lower information costs.
In deriving equation (18) w ef o l l o w e dt h ec o n v e n t i o no ft r e a t i n gt h e
sticky price parameter θ as ﬁxed. Casual theorising suggests that this is at
best a convenient approximation. The probability that a ﬁrm will re-set its
price - a convenient analytic way of representing those factors responsible
for price stickiness (e.g. ‘menu costs’) - is likely to be diﬀerent in an econ-
omy experiencing zero inﬂation from one experiencing substantially higher
inﬂation.
A more formal theoretical basis for the prediction that θ will be a func-
tion of an economy’s inﬂation rate is developed in Ball, Mankiw and Romer
(1988). In their model, imperfectly competitive ﬁrms face a ﬁxed cost of
changing their prices but can select the length of the interval between price
changes. Maximisation of expected discounted current and future proﬁts
implies that the optimal interval will be a function of the average inﬂa-
tion rate. High inﬂation causes a ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximising nominal price to
change rapidly, which raises the beneﬁts from frequent adjustment.13 In our
empirical work in the next section, we build on this work and that of Hamil-
ton (1990) by allowing the economy to experience diﬀerent inﬂation regimes
12It is relatively straightforward to rewrite the more conventional New-Keynesian model
-e q u a t i o n(19) - in its more familiar form, πt = βEtπt+1 + λ(MCt − pt) where λ (=
(1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ ) is positive.
13Ball, et al. (1988) also ﬁnd that it will decrease the greater the variance of aggregate
and ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks. ‘When either variance is large, a ﬁrm’s future proﬁt-maximising
price is highly uncertain, so the ﬁrm does not wish to ﬁx its price for long’ (p. 25).Inflation Dynamics and Inflation Regimes 9
and by allowing θ to be diﬀerent in the diﬀerent regimes. As is clear from
equations (18) diﬀerent values for θ will imply diﬀerent inﬂation dynamics.
In the next section we consider how (18) can be tested and report the
results of testing it using UK data.
3 Data and Empirical Results
To test our model we estimate equation (18) by GMM and test the overi-
dentifying restrictions it implies.14 To see the nature of these restrictions,
assume that we have determined the appropriate value of n in equation (18)
and hence the order of the lag on πt, and, by implication, on ∆MCt.T h e
number of reduced-form (unrestricted) coeﬃcients to be estimated is then
2(n+1 ) . Because the k∗
is in equation (18) are themselves functions of β, θ,
and the ρRs, there are n+2structural parameters. The model therefore has
n overidentifying restrictions.
In equation (18) the parameter θ is treated as a constant. We wish to
test for the inﬂuence of the economy’s inﬂation regime on θ and therefore
need to identify diﬀerent inﬂation regimes. To do so we estimated a two-
state Markov switching model.15 The results, presented in Figure 1, sug-
gested two low-inﬂation regimes, 1963Q2-1970Q4 and 1982Q1-2000Q4 with
am e a ni n ﬂation rate of 1.02% per quarter, and one high-inﬂation regime,
1971Q1-1981Q4 with a mean inﬂation rate of 3.28% per quarter. Sample
size limitations16 prevented estimation of our model over the three separate
periods and we therefore adopted two estimation strategies. In the ﬁrst,
we estimated and tested the model separately over the two periods 1963Q2-
1981Q4 and 1982Q1-2000Q4. The ﬁrst period we view as the ‘high-inﬂation
regime’ and the second period the ‘low-inﬂation regime’. We then compared
the estimates of θ for the two periods. Because the ﬁrst of these two sub-
s a m p l e sc o v e r sa ni n i t i a le p s i o d eo fl o wi n ﬂation, in the second approach we
estimated the model over a 15-year moving window, starting with the period
1963Q2-1978Q1 and ending with the period 1986Q1-2000Q4. This approach
gives us a set of 91 estimates of each parameter, in particular of θ.F r o m
these estimates of θ w ec a nd e r i v ea ni m p l i e ds e r i e sf o rt h em e a nl e n g t ho f
time before a price is reset, and we can compare this with the behaviour of
inﬂation.
Our data, full details of which are given in Appendix B, are from the
UK and cover the private (non-government) sector. We adopt data deﬁni-
tions similar to those employed by Batini, Jackson and Nickell (2000). The
14All versions of the model are estimated using weights based on a consistent estimator
of the asymptotic covariance matrix of the unrestricted model. This permits tests of the
overidentifying restrictions we discuss below.
15Maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters were obtained using Hamilton’s
(1990) EM algorithm.
16The initial low-inﬂation period covers only 29 quarters.Inflation Dynamics and Inflation Regimes 10
inﬂation rate (π) is deﬁned as the quarterly change in the log of the overall
GDP price deﬂator.17 A series for unit labour costs was constructed by
taking the ratio of nominal non-government compensation of employees to
real non-government GDP. The log of this ratio deﬁnes our variable MC.
We adjust the published compensation estimates to include a labour income
component of the income of the self-employed.18
The adjustment we make to employee compensation implies that the
average return to labour of the self-employed is equal to the average re-
muneration of employees in employment. Self-employment income is not
separately identiﬁed in the UK accounts19 so we follow the procedure used
by Batini et al. (2000), who adjust compensation by the ratio of total em-
ployment to the number of employees. The imputation of labour income of
the self-employed is particularly important given the growing importance of
these sectors: the proportion of self-employment to total employment rose
in the UK from around 8% in 1960 to 13% in 2000.
We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two series - π and ∆MC
- are stationarity, the ADF test statistics of -2.921 and -4.018 (respectively)
being signiﬁcant at the 5% level (assuming one lagged term in both cases)20.
A number of econometric issues arise in the estimation of equation (14).
The presence of the contemporaneous term ∆MC requires the use of an
instrumental variable estimator. The error term added to (14) may also be
serially correlated or heteroskedastic. A number of potential sources for this
error suggest that the errors may be serially correlated in (14). The markup
parameter (µ) may be subject to random variation; there may be random
departures from the optimal price (1); equation (1)i sa l s oal o g a r i t h m i ca p -
proximation. These terms would appear in diﬀerence form in equation (14):
and since we do not know their statistical properties in equation (1), they
may introduce serial correlation of unkown form in equation (14).F o rt h e s e
reasons we estimate this equation by GMM and, in Table 1 we report the
estimates of equation (18) for the two assumed inﬂation regimes (together
with our full-sample estimates).21 The lag length, n,f o rt h et h r e ep e r i o d s
17The prices are basic prices. As Batini et al point out, the use of basic prices means
that value added is measured net of indirect taxes, which is theoretically more appropriate
than measures in market prices. It was not possible to construct the non-government GDP
deﬂator due to the lack of a constant price government value added series.
18This procedure is adopted by Batini, Jackson and Nickell (2000). It has been used
in other contexts when calculating aggregate labour income (see for example Blinder and
Deaton (1985)).
19The income of the self-employed is now consolidated with other incomes in an ‘Other
Income’ category.
20The lag length was determined by truncating at the last signiﬁcant t-statistic.
21Using the full sample and ﬁrst sub-sample the instruments used were as follows: lags
1t o6i nπ,l a g s1t o5i n∆MC, and lags 1 to 2 in both the output gap (deﬁned as
de-trended log output) and wage inﬂation. For the second sub-sample the additional lags
required the addition of a seven-quarter lag in π and a six-quarter lag in ∆MC.Inflation Dynamics and Inflation Regimes 11
was determined by the last signiﬁcant ρR.22 F o ra l lt h r e ep e r i o d st h ed i a g -
nostic statistics are satisfactory though there is a hint of higher-order serial
correlation in the high inﬂation regime. We also computed the Newey-West
(1987) ‘D’ test statistic of the model’s overidentifying restrictions, a test
which is analogous to the likelihood ratio test.23 The statistic is distributed
as chi—square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions
imposed. For all three periods, the null hypothesis that the restrictions are
valid cannot be rejected at conventional signiﬁcance levels. The estimates
of β are, for all periods, close to 1 though the point estimate for the low
inﬂation regime is clearly too high.
The estimates of the ρR parameters for the three periods all show the
same pattern: they are all positive, highest at the ﬁrst order and then
d e c l i n i n g ,a n di na l lp e r i o d st h es u mo ft h ee s t i m a t e so ft h eρR parameters
is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. However, in the case of the low inﬂation
regime, both the sum of the coeﬃcients on lagged inﬂation is notably higher,
and there are more signiﬁcant higher-order lags. Both these characteristics
suggest that inﬂation exhibits greater sluggishness in a low inﬂation regime,
over and above any eﬀect due to changes in θ. One possibility is that this
greater sluggishness may be due to a lengthening of the period covered by
wage contracts.
The three estimates of θ show the pattern we would predict: the lowest
estimate is found for the high inﬂation regime, and the highest estimate for
the low inﬂation regime. For the high inﬂation regime the estimate of θ
suggest a mean interval of just under a year before prices can be expected
to be reset - an interval lower than, but not too dissimilar to that found
for the whole period. The low inﬂation regime suggests a mean interval of
more than two years. All our estimates of θ a r eh i g h e rt h a nt h a ts u g g e s t e d
in Hall et al.’s (1997), survey of 654 UK companies. They found that in
the year to September 1995 (in a low-inﬂation period) the median number
of times that prices were changed was twice a year, which suggests a value
of θ of 0.5. This diﬀerence may be due to the sample used in Hall et al.
which substantially over-represents large ﬁrms, though the direction of bias
this might introduce into the estimate of θ is not obvious. Taylor (1999)
reviewed the direct evidence on the frequency of price changes in the US
and concluded that ‘price changes and wage changes have about the same
average frequency - about one year’ (p.1020), implying a value of θ of around
0.75 which is noticeably closer to our estimate.
22Using data over the period 1963Q2-1981Q4, we obtained an estimate of ρR,4 of 0.175
with a standard error of 0.109, so for this period we truncate at n =3 .F o r t h e p e r i o d
1982Q1-2000Q4 we obtained an estimate of ρR,7 of 0.132 with a standard error of 0.131
and we truncate the lags at n =6 .
23See Newey and West (1987) p.780, equation (2.9). The test statistic D requires that
the same estimate of the covariance matrix is used in both the restricted and unrestricted
models as this ensures that D>0.Inflation Dynamics and Inflation Regimes 12
The results we report in Table 1 are therefore consistent with the new-
Keynesian model represented by equation (18) and with the suggestion that
the dynamics of inﬂation are diﬀerent in diﬀerent inﬂation regimes. To
illustrate the eﬀects of the diﬀerent regimes, we present in Figure 2, the
impulse response of inﬂation to an unexpected and permanent jump in the
value of ∆MCimplied by the estimates for the high and low inﬂation regimes
presented in the second two columns of Table 1. In the high inﬂation regime
inﬂation moves relatively quickly and smoothly to its new equilibrium level
- within approximately 5 periods the inﬂation rate is within 20% of it. In
the low inﬂation regime the approach is slower and more erratic - even after
10 periods inﬂation has not moved to within 25% of its new equilibrium.
In Figures 3 to 6 we present selected results of estimating the model
using a 15-year moving window.24 Figure 3 presents the estimates of θ,
together with 5% conﬁdence bands and the implied mean interval between
price changes. Figure 4 presents estimates of the sum of the ﬁrst three
ρRs and associated 5% conﬁdence intervals. Figure 5 presents estimates of
the sum of the second three ρRs and associated 5% conﬁdence intervals.
Figure 3 suggests that from the late 1970s or early 1980s there has been a
steady rise in θ and the implied mean interval between price changes. The
estimated value of θ from roughly 1983 onwards is well above the higher
95% conﬁdence limit estimated from earlier data. Figures 4 and 5 suggest
that there has been a similar rise in the sum of the ﬁrst and second triplets
of ρRs beginning at roughly the same time. Here too the sum of the two sets
of coeﬃcients tend, by the end of the period, to be above their respective
higher 95% conﬁdence limits estimated from earlier data. In Figure 6 we






against the mean quarterly inﬂation rate (%), π,o v e r
observations in the moving window. The negative relationship between T
and π is clear from the ﬁgure. A simple regression of the estimated contract
length (in quarters) against mean inﬂation (%) and its square gives (standard
errors in parentheses),








This regression suggest that, as the mean inﬂation rate rises over the rel-
evant range, the contract length shortens, but at a diminishing rate. The
shortest estimated contract length we estimate is 2.6 quarters based on data
centred on 1973Q4, when the mean inﬂation rate was 2.67% per quarter
(around 11% per annum). The longest average contract length we estimate
is 9.7 quarters based on data centred on 1990Q1 with a mean inﬂation rate of
1.08% per quarter (4.4% per annum). Using equation (20), we can calculate
24For the moving window regressions we allow for six ρR terms.Inflation Dynamics and Inflation Regimes 13
the implied contract lengths for the two mean inﬂation rates estimated us-
ing the two-regime Markov switching model: a low-inﬂation mean of 1.016%
and a high-inﬂation mean of 3.284%. The respective contract lengths are
8.3 and 2.6 quarters (approximately two years and eight months respec-
tively).25 Evaluating equation (20) for the overall sample mean inﬂation
rate of 1.66% per quarter, implies a contract length of 6.2 quarters. The
diﬀerence between this estimate and that reported in the ﬁrst column of
Table 1 suggests that important information can be lost when analysing in-
ﬂationary dynamics if one ignores diﬀerences in the underlying inﬂationary
regimes. Our results also suggest that the direct evidence reported by Hall
et al. (1997) underestimates the mean duration of average price contracts
in the UK.
4 Summary and Conclusions
Mankiw (2001) has described the new-Keynesian model of inﬂation as ‘ul-
timately a failure’: it simply cannot explain the dynamics of inﬂation - in
particular the observed inﬂuence of lags of inﬂation on current inﬂation -
without recourse to theoretically awkward, ad hoc assumptions such as the
existence of a fraction of ﬁrms who set prices by some rule of thumb. In
this paper we have modiﬁed the new-Keynesian model in two main ways to
overcome this failure. Both modiﬁcations are theoretically well-grounded.
In the ﬁr s tw eh a v ea l l o w e dﬁrms optimally to select the information set
upon which they form their expectations. Their expectations are still ra-
tional in the sense that they are based on a full exploitation of the ﬁrms’
information set, and they are optimal in the sense that in deciding the con-
tent of that information set ﬁrms are assumed to weigh up the non-zero
costs and beneﬁts associated with enlarging it.
The second modiﬁcation appeals to a theoretical literature which sug-
gests that the frequency of price setting will be a function of the economy’s
inﬂation rate, speciﬁcally that in high inﬂation economies prices will be
reset more frequently. The resultant model suggests that lagged inﬂation
rates will have a greater inﬂuence on current inﬂation than the standard
new-Keynesian model suggests. We ﬁnd that we cannot reject the formal
restrictions implied by the model (using UK quarterly data) and we estimate
that the mean time before prices were reset was around eight months dur-
ing the ‘high’ inﬂationary regime and approximately two years when mean
inﬂation was ‘low’.
25We also estimated equation (20) with b θsa st h er e g r e s s o ra n do b t a i n e de s t i m a t e so f
the ‘low’ and ‘high’ inﬂation regime contract lengths from the predicted θs. Using this
approach we estimate the contract length for the low inﬂation regime to be 8.0 quarters
and that for the high inﬂation regime to be 2.4 quarters. These are very similar to those
based on regressions involving T.Inflation Dynamics and Inflation Regimes 14




Constant 0.000 -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
b θ 0.774 0.729 0.903
(0.028) (0.037) (0.027)
b ρR,1 0.794 0.748 1.076
(0.089) (0.078) (0.116)
b ρR,2 0.508 0.440 0.866
(0.089) (0.098) (0.143)
b ρR,3 0.388 0.202 0.730
(0.111) (0.062) (0.146)
b ρR,4 0.226 - 0.467
(0.097) (0.145)
b ρR,5 0.171 - 0.532
(0.083) (0.112)
b ρR,6 - - 0.360
(0.089)
b β 0.926 0.952 1.226
(0.165) (0.177) (0.095) P
b ρR,i 2.088 1.390 4.032
(0.395) (0.187) (0.678)
Q(4) 0.789 0.865 0.115
Q(8) 0.550 0.044 0.367
p(J) 0.852 0.500 0.155
p(D) 0.876 0.123 0.118
T 4.415 3.690 10.279
Notes: Estimated standard errors in (.) with a Newey-West correction.
Q(n) is the p-value of the Ljung-Box test for nth order serial correlation.
p(J) is the p-value of the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions.
p(D) is the p-value of the Newey-West (1987) test of the model’s restrictions.
T ≡ 1
1−b θ
is the expected duration of prices.Inflation Dynamics and Inflation Regimes 15
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Data Appendix
The raw data used in this paper can be downloaded from the following
University of Bristol web site:
http://www.ecn.bris.ac.uk/www/ecdd/newk/newk.htm
The data were obtained from the National Statistics DataBank Online
at http://www.data-archive.ac.uk/. The four-digit codes are the relevant
National Statistics codes for the series used.
π is the inﬂation rate deﬁned as the ﬁrst diﬀerence in the logarithm of
the GDP deﬂator: πt = log(DEFt) − log(DEFt−1), where DEF = ABML
ABMM,
ABML is Gross Value Added (average) in current basic prices, seasonally
adjusted; and ABMM is Gross Value Added in 1995 basic prices, seasonally
adjusted.
The logarithm of nominal marginal cost (MC)i sd e ﬁned as:















where DTWM is total compensation of employees (£m) seasonally adjusted;
NMXSa is the variable NMXS seasonally-adjusted (X11), where NMXS is
compensation of employees in government seasonally unadjusted; similarly
NMXVa is the variable NMXV seasonally-adjusted, where NMXV is general
government gross operating surplus; DYZN is the number of self-employed
workforce jobs (000, seasonally adjusted); and BCAJ is the number of em-
ployee workforce jobs (000, seasonally adjusted). Prior to 1978, the two
employment series were available for the second quarter in each year only,
so for these years observations for other quarters were derived by linear in-
terpolation. This deﬁnition of labour share follows the preferred deﬁnition
adopted by Batini, Jackson and Nickell (2000). In the absence of a constant
p r i c es e r i e sf o rg o v e r n m e n tv a l u ea d d e d ,w eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tt h eg o v e r n -
ment value added deﬂator is the same as that for Gross Value Added. The
growth in nominal marginal costs is deﬁned as: ∆MCt ≡ MCt − MCt−1.
Real output (y) is ABMM, gross value added in 1995 basic prices, sea-








and wage inﬂation is deﬁned as ∆wt =l o g ( Wt) − log(Wt−1).Figure 1
UK: Probability of Low Inflation Regime
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